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I. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, the substantive foundations of Anglo-American civil 
law have been the doctrinal trio of contracts, torts, and property.1  Even 
at present, separate courses on these three basic bodies of civil law are 
the mainstay of the critical first year of American legal education.2  
Legal philosophers have debated and analyzed the nature of the three 
for almost as long.3  This article describes a new way of evaluating the 
trio and their interrelationships, based on Hegel’s famous dialectical 
method.  This article suggests an arithmetic analysis, namely that 
property is the sum of tort and contract, and uses trade secrets, a type of 
intellectual property, as the paradigm.  The rights, remedies, and 
available defendants in the three doctrines, as trade secret law 
illustrates, provide evidence that the analysis is sound, and the article 
concludes with practical consequences and examples the analysis 
implies. 
II. THESIS 
In the modern American legal system, the concept or doctrine of 
property is the arithmetic sum of the concepts or doctrines of contracts 
and torts; trade secret law is an excellent illustration of this principle. 
III. ROADMAP 
This article commences with an introduction to the use of Hegel’s 
famous dialectical method as an arithmetic analysis of law.  It reviews 
Hegel’s assertion that the sum of property and contract is tort and 
crime, and then suggests a better dialectic that contract plus tort equals 
property.  This article then reviews the doctrines of contract, tort, and 
property, focusing on the plaintiff’s rights and remedies, and who can be 
defendants in each of the three doctrines.  The article next reviews the 
law of one particular type of intellectual property, trade secrets, because 
this article uses trade secrets as a good example of how contract and tort 
total to property.  This article then culminates in an explanation of how 
trade secrets illustrate that property is the sum of contract and tort, 
 
1.  See Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education:  An 
Historical Framework -- A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the Founding of the 
Republic until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 1057 (2006).   
2.  See, e.g., Office of Career Services, HARV. L. SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/degrees/jd/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).   
3.  See, e.g., Richard Brooks, Law and Civil Society in the United States, Canada, 
Quebec, and the First Nations, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1998).   
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because property rights, remedies, and defendants are the total of 
contract and tort rights, remedies, and defendants.  This article gives 
illustrations of how the thesis explains certain oddities from property 
law other than intellectual property, and the article then concludes. 
IV. ARITHMETIC LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Recent decades have seen an explosion of various ways for 
academics and practitioners to analyze the law.  Famous examples 
include economic analysis of law,4 feminist analysis of law,5 
psychological6 (and even psychoanalytic7) analysis of law, and so forth.  
This article is written in the spirit of mathematical analysis of law, 
suggesting that property is the arithmetic sum of contract and tort.  
Mathematical analysis of law is not new; influential German idealist 
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the first who 
used it, with his famous dialectical method.8 
A.  Hegel 
1.  Dialectics Are Sums 
While regarded as one of the world’s greatest philosophers in all of 
history, scholars today principally remember him for his dialectical 
method.9  The “Idea,” Hegel’s name for reality, develops or “unfolds,” 
according to him, through an unending dialectical process.10  He 
describes this process as beginning with a concept, any concept, which 
he called the thesis.11  The concept immediately implies its opposite, or 
negation, which he naturally called the antithesis.12  The thesis and its 
antithesis, being opposites, conflict with each other.13  The conflict 
 
4.  Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law 
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).   
5.  Marie-Claire Belleau, Mail-Order Brides in a Global World, 67 ALB. L. REV. 595 
(2003).   
6.  Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do 
Workers Know When It Is Harassment and When It Is Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1997). 
7.  See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 629 (2011). 
8.  WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: A REINTERPRETATION § 37 (1966).   
9.  Id.   
10.  GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC § 1640 (A. 
V. Miller trans. 1969), available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012).   
11.  Id. at § 1631.   
12.  Id. at § 1632.   
13.  Id. at § 1633.   
CAVANAUGH- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  2:10 PM 
432  MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 16:2 
 
resolves itself through a creative process of compromise between the 
thesis and the antithesis.  Hegel called the outcome the synthesis.14  The 
synthesis is its own wholly new concept; i.e., the synthesis is a new 
thesis.15  This new thesis immediately implies its own antithesis, these 
two synthesize to create another new thesis, and the process continues 
forever.16 
One of Hegel’s most famous dialectics, that of existence, serves well 
as an example.  Being is the thesis, but being implies its opposite, the 
absence of being, which is nothingness.  Bringing the thesis, being, and 
its antithesis, nothing, together, results in the new concept of becoming 
(which Hegel calls the “unity” of being and nothingness), the synthesis.  
The synthesis, becoming, is the new thesis, which then implies its own 
negation, and on the process goes.17 
Hegel’s concept of thesis and antithesis coming together and 
resulting in something new, while unquestionably brilliant, is nothing 
more than arithmetic addition (part of the elegant simplicity that makes 
his concept so remarkable).18  In the mathematical process of addition, 
two values come together (unify) and result in a new value.19 
2.  Philosophy of Right 
Hegel applied his dialectical theory to law (and much else) in his 
book Elements of the Philosophy of Right.  In that work, Hegel 
described property as a function of individualism.  A person, a human 
individual, makes herself complete, according to Hegel, by (among 
other things) possessing, enjoying, and using property.20  Property rights 
are exclusive rights, in two senses: one, only a specific and relatively 
small group of persons (usually just one) owns any particular private 
property; and two, property rights are rights to exclude non-owners from 
possession and use of the particular property.21 
 
14.  Id. at § 1633.   
15.  Id. at § 1639.   
16.  Id. at § 1640.   
17.  Id. at §§ 132–34.    
18.  Id. at § 1633.   
19.  See generally, GEORGE M. BERGMAN, AN INVITATION TO GENERAL ALGEBRA 
AND UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTIONS (1998).   
20. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT 97 (Allen W. Wood ed., Hugh Barr Nisbet trans., 1991).   
21.  Id. at 81.   
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3.  Thesis: Property (One Person’s Rights Alone) 
One acquires property, according to Hegel, by involving the outside 
object (which thus becomes the property) with oneself, or conversely, by 
involving oneself with the object.22  He believed that property helps 
define its owner, and helps the owner express himself as a person.23  
Hegel followed the lead of British philosopher John Locke, who earlier 
suggested a narrower version of Hegel’s hypothesis, writing that a 
person obtains property by mixing the person’s labor with the property 
(e.g., farming land to produce edible crops, etc.).24  Hegel’s broader 
theory would allow a person to become the owner of e.g., a tract of land, 
merely by choosing it and fencing it off.25 
Hegel’s pure theory of property, as a dialectical thesis, involves only 
the owning person and the owned object.26  The very essence of property 
as a concept is that it excludes everyone, and indeed, everything else.27  
For any given property, all other objects that could be property, and all 
other persons who could be owners, are by definition excluded from this 
particular owner / property relationship.28  Here, Hegel followed the 
celebrated “state of nature” concept of Locke and other champions of 
the social contract, such as British philosopher Thomas Hobbes and 
French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, all of whom suggested that 
without law, a person can own property only by personally and 
physically seizing and defending the property.29 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right states, however, that any person is only 
truly free and whole living in a civilized society with other people and 
human institutions.30  He therefore agrees with Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau that the social contract is necessary.31  The pure owner 
pursuant to Hegel’s property thesis will need to defend her claims 
against all other persons’ claims by herself; for example, to prevent 
trespassers, she might have to build an electrified fence or remain on the 
 
22.  Id. at 82.   
23.  Id. at 76.   
24.  Id. at 84.   
25.  Id. at 97. 
26.  Id. at 95. 
27.  Id. at 81.   
28.  Id.  
29.  JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 29, 34 (1986), 
available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr05.htm. 
30.  HEGEL, supra note 20, at 95.   
31.  Id. at 105.   
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property with a weapon at all times.32  Another problem she faces is 
what to do with the bounty of the land (e.g., crops) beyond what she can 
personally use herself.33 
4.  Antithesis: Contract (Rights Distributed Among People) 
Hegel’s property thesis, therefore (as always), necessarily implies its 
own antithesis.  To Hegel, the antithesis of property is contract.  In 
order for the property owner to make the most valuable and enriching 
use of her property (e.g., selling its excess product, not having to guard 
it personally at all times, etc.), the owner must accede to the social 
contract and thus become part of human society.34  By being a part of 
functioning society, the individual enhances her use and enjoyment of 
her property.35  She can sell it or its products if she chooses, she can rely 
on the government’s mechanisms and functionaries to enforce her rights 
in it, she can lease it, etc.36  She does all these and all similar things 
regarding her property by making agreements with other people.37  The 
government will enforce her agreements, both for her and against her, 
just as it enforces her property rights.38  This of course is contract, and 
contract is thus (according to Hegel), the antithesis of property. 
5.  Synthesis: “Wrong” (i.e., Crime and Tort; Enforces Distributed 
Rights) 
Hegel’s synthesis of the property thesis and its contract antithesis is 
what he called “wrong.”39  He uses the word as a noun in this sense, 
meaning the whole of what modern American legal philosophers call 
torts and crimes.40  Strict liability aside, torts and crimes require the 
defendant to have some degree of mens rea, ranging from desiring harm 
to another to simple carelessness.41  This is why Hegel refers to both as 
 
32.  Id. at 95.  
33.  Id. at 97. 
34.  Id. at 230. 
35.  Id. at 107. 
36.  Id. at 97, 270. 
37.  Id. at 109. 
38.  Id. at 253. 
39.  Id. at 117.  
40.  See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional 
Harm to Persons – Thoughts,  44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2009) (explaining intent 
in tort); Dannye Holley, Mens Rea Evaluations by the United States Supreme Court: It Does 
Not Have the Tools and Only Occasionally Displays the Talent—A Sixty-Year Report Card— 
1950–2009, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 401 (2010) (explaining mens rea in crime).   
41.  Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE 
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“wrongs.”  In Hegel’s view, the laws of tort and crime, and their 
enforcement by the government and its courts, are the machinery of 
defending and exonerating each individual’s rights (tort), and society’s 
rights as a whole (crime).42  The property owner can thus use the police 
to evict trespassers, get damages for trespass or breach, etc.  (While 
modern American law does not see breach of contract as a moral 
wrong,43 for various policy reasons,44 the law in Hegel’s time did consider 
breach a “wrong” in the sense of a tort.45) 
6.  So Property + Contract = “Wrong” 
One major dictionary describes “synthesis” as “the composition or 
combination of parts or elements so as to form a whole[,] . . . the 
combining of often diverse conceptions into a coherent whole.”46  The 
same dictionary defines “addition” as “the operation of combining 
numbers so as to obtain an equivalent simple quantity.”47  Note that the 
definitions of synthesis and addition both contain the concept of 
combining.  Pursuant to Euclid’s geometric law of transitivity (things 
equal to the same thing are equal to each other),48 the mathematical 
equivalent of Hegel’s synthesis is therefore the arithmetic function of 
addition; Hegel is asserting that in his political philosophy, property plus 
contract equals tort and crime. 
B. Criticism 
Many philosophers and commentators over the centuries have 
disagreed with, or criticized, Hegel’s methods, including his assertion 
that wrong is the sum of property and contract.49  In modern American 
law, at least, the arithmetic is different.  While Hegel supplies a useful 
precedent for arithmetic analysis of law, the better understanding, at 
least here and now, is that property is not an addend but instead the 
sum: the correct addends that equal property are contract and tort, as 
 
DAME L. REV. 1551, 1561 (1999).   
42.  HEGEL, supra note 20, at 244–45. 
43.  23 CAL. JUR. DAMAGES § 148 (3d ed. 2011).   
44.  Id.     
45.  HEGEL, supra note 20, at 250. 
46.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synthesis (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2012).   
47.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/addition (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2012).   
48. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
602836/transitive-law (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).   
49.  See generally MICHAEL ROSEN, HEGEL’S DIALECTIC AND ITS CRITICISM (1985).   
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the following sections explain. 
C.  Transition: Review of Contract, Tort, and Property 
Now that this article has introduced the arithmetic analysis of law 
concept and Hegel’s dialectic positing that contract plus property equals 
tort and crime, this article next reviews the basics of the modern 
American law of contract, tort, and property.  This review focuses on 
the various doctrines’ rights, remedies, and possible defendants as a 
background to the introduction of how trade secret law illustrates that 
the correct sum is contract plus tort equals property. 
V. CONTRACT, TORT, AND PROPERTY: RIGHTS, DEFENDANTS, AND 
REMEDIES 
Writers have discoursed extensively for centuries on the definition 
and nature of these three basic doctrines of civil law;50 it would be 
redundant for this article to try to repeat or summarize these extensive 
writings.  This article instead presents one particular method of 
comparing and contrasting the three doctrines that is useful for 
demonstrating the validity of this article’s thesis. 
That method of analysis is to ask, for each of the three doctrines, 
against who does the plaintiff, in a suit based on the doctrine, have 
enforceable rights?  This article considers the answer to this question, 
the underlying reasons for the answer, and the plaintiff’s related 
remedies, in turn for each of contract, tort, and property.  (As 
injunctions are generally available in contract, tort, and property cases, 
this article focuses on the damages remedy.) 
A.  Contract 
1.  Right Is to Performance 
A contracting party has the legal right to the other party’s 
performance of the contract.51 
2.  Plaintiff Has Rights Against the Other Party to the Contract 
A plaintiff’s action in contract seeks remedies against the other party 
to the contract for the breach of that other person’s promise to the 
 
50.  George L. Priest, The Modern Transformation of Civil Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 957, 
958 (2006). 
51.   See, e.g., 10 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 943 (Joseph M. 
Perillo rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 10].   
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plaintiff to do, or refrain from doing, something that the plaintiff 
wishes.52  To breach a promise is to fail to perform the promise fully at, 
or over, the proper time.53  Almost all contracts are two party 
agreements, i.e., there are no more than two parties to the particular 
contract.54  The parties generally form the contract by mutually agreeing; 
i.e., they exchange promises.55  In the typical bilateral contract, the 
parties, at the time of contract formation, promise to perform in the 
future.56 
a. Voluntary Defendant 
In a contract action, therefore, the plaintiff and the defendant must 
be the two parties to the contract the plaintiff claims the defendant 
breached; no one else generally has standing.57  (There are limited, and 
relatively recent, exceptions to this rule involving third party 
beneficiaries.)58  To be a plaintiff in any particular breach of contract 
action, therefore, a person must have entered into a specific contract in 
the past with the particular person who is the defendant.  (There are 
again limited exceptions involving such things as assignment and 
delegation;59 while these add some complexity to the analysis, the 
underlying theory remains the same.)60 
There is, therefore, an extremely limited set of persons that any 
particular plaintiff can sue for breach of any particular contract.  In 
almost all cases, there is only one person so amenable to the suit.  That 
one person is the other party, to this particular contract, of this 
particular plaintiff.61  Contract plaintiffs have thus voluntarily entered in 
a legal relationship with their defendants. 
b. “Choice of Defendant” 
Commentators, therefore, often state that the contract plaintiff has 
 
52.  1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (Joseph M. Perillo 
rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 1].   
53.  CORBIN 10, supra note 51, at § 943. 
54.  CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at  § 1.23.   
55.  CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.   
56.  CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.23.   
57.  CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.   
58.  9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 43.1 (Joseph M. Perillo 
rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 9].   
59.  Id. at § 47.1.   
60.  CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.   
61.  Id.at § 1.3.   
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chosen her defendant in advance.62  In breach of contract suits, the 
defendant is almost never a stranger to the plaintiff.63  The requirement 
of mutual assent for contract formation assures that plaintiff and 
defendant knew each other, at least to some limited degree, and often 
extensively, before entering into the agreement.64  The plaintiff chose 
this defendant from whom to receive this particular performance.  In 
major transactions, the parties usually conduct what they call “due 
diligence” before executing the agreement; this diligence often involves 
lengthy and extensive investigation of the other party.65 
3.  What Defendant Behavior Violates Rights 
A defendant violates another’s contract rights by not performing an 
unexcused promise in a legally enforceable agreement to which the 
defendant and the other are parties.66 
4.  Remedies Are Limited 
This choice of defendants has significant practical consequences for 
contract plaintiffs.67  One of the most important is the sharp limitations 
that courts usually place on remedies for breach of contract, as opposed 
to the usual remedies in tort and property actions.68 
a. Benefit of Bargain 
The basic and preferred remedy for breach of contract is expectation 
damages.69  This type of damages gives the non-breaching plaintiff the 
so-called “benefit of the bargain.”70  A typical measure is the sales price 
in cases regarding breaches of contracts for sales of property, whether 
real or personal.71  If the buyer is the non-breaching plaintiff, the market 
value of the subject property less the sales price is the expectation 
 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at § 1.12.   
65.  See generally Oldcastle Materials, Inc. v. Rohlin, 343 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Iowa 
2004).   
66.  See, e.g., CORBIN 10, supra note 51, at § 943.   
67.  See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987) 
(noting that the reasonable wealth and domicile of defendant can affect the laws applied to 
the claim and, therefore, the available remedies).   
68.  E.g., 23 CAL. JUR. DAMAGES § 148 (3d ed. 2011).   
69.  11 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.11 (Joseph M. Perillo 
rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 11]. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. 
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damages, allowing the plaintiff to purchase substitute property in the 
open market.72 
b. No Penalties 
Every American first year law student currently learns the important 
difference between liquidated damages and penalties.73  Courts will of 
course enforce reasonable liquidated damages, as long as these damages 
do not amount to penalties.74  Courts do not enforce penalties that 
contracts may contain for breach.75 
The modern economic analysis of law movement has written 
extensively about the sound public policy reasons behind not enforcing 
penalties for contract breach.76  These reasons generally have to do with 
the fact that all real world contracts are incomplete, and if the parties to 
any particular contract had completed it, they would rationally have 
realized, and incorporated into the contract, the undesirability of breach 
penalties.77  This leads to the concept of “economically efficient 
breaches,” probably the best known theory of the law and economics 
movement.78  Penalties for breach would discourage breaches that are 
economically efficient, and this would reduce the wealth of society as a 
whole.79 
c. No Punitive (or Emotional Distress or Pain and Suffering) Damages 
Perhaps the most famous contract remedy limitation is punitive 
damages.  Courts generally refuse to award punitive damages for 
breaches of contracts, regardless of the defendants’ bad faith, whereas 
punitive awards are commonplace in many tort actions.80  Our legal 
 
72.  David W. Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 
6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 397, 466 (1998).   
73.  See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of 
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 635 (2001).   
74.  Id.  
75.  Id. at 634.   
76.  See Gil Lahav, Contract Law: A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its 
Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163 (2000).   
77.  Richard R. W. Brooks, What Efficiency Demands: The Efficient Performance 
Hypothesis Defended, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 14, 15 (2007).   
78.  Lahav, supra note 76, at 163.   
79.  Brooks, supra note 77, at 19.   
80.  See, e.g., Patricia Maria Basseto Avallone, The Award of Punitive and Emotional 
Distress Damages in Breach of Contract Cases: A Comparison between the American and the 
Brazilian Legal Systems, 8 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 253, 257 (2002).   
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system indeed treats all contract breaches as intentional.81  There are a 
variety of justifications for these doctrines82 (the basic reason is, as the 
immediately preceding paragraph suggests, that our legal system does 
not see contract breach as a moral wrong deserving punishment),83 but 
as the text in section V(a)(ii)(2) above explains, one significant 
justification is the ability of contract plaintiffs to choose their 
defendants.84 
The underlying reasoning for this particular justification is that the 
court should not punish a defendant, and correspondingly enrich the 
plaintiff, when the parties had the opportunity to select each other from 
various possible contractors, and used (as is inevitable) incomplete 
contracts.85  Courts (and law and economics scholars) reason that in 
typical contract cases plaintiffs and defendants had the opportunity to 
investigate each other to ascertain, among other things, the other party’s 
ability to perform, financial solvency, etc.86  In this situation, the 
contracting parties have voluntarily assumed a great deal of risk 
regarding each other’s ability to perform and pay expectation damages.87  
(Courts similarly limit other types of damages, such as emotional 
distress and pain and suffering, in contract cases for similar reasons.88  
Like punitives, these damages are generally available in tort and 
property cases.)89 
d. Avoidability, Foreseeability, and Certainty 
The law places important limitations on damages related to the 
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty of the damages requested.  
Plaintiffs in general must prove that any claimed damages element was a 
loss the plaintiff could not have reasonably avoided; that both parties 
could reasonably have foreseen before the loss; and if the claimed 
damages element is for something occurring after trial, that the loss is 
 
81.  See Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link between 
Definitions and Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2009).   
82.  Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 459 (2006).   
83.  Id.   
84.  See John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based 
upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 
1565, 1566 (1986).  
85.  See id. 
86.  See id.   
87.  See id. at 1567.   
88.  See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:  DAMAGES–EQUITY– RESTITUTION 
789 (2d ed. 1993).   
89.  See, e.g., id. at 572–75, 652–56.   
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reasonably certain to occur.90 
These damage limitations apply to both tort and contract suits, but 
courts enforce the limitations more strictly in contract cases.91  Contract 
damages are indeed generally less generous to plaintiffs (and 
correspondingly less burdensome to defendants) than tort damages.92  
Courts again use the choice of defendant rationale as one reason so to 
limit contract damages.93  (Other reasons include the nature of many tort 
injuries, such as bodily harm, compared to typical contract “injuries,” 
which are generally economic in nature.)94 
As described above in section V(A)(2)(b), contract plaintiffs are 
able to investigate their defendants, including the defendants’ financial 
status and reputation, before the parties enter into their agreements.95  
Tort plaintiffs, on the other hand, are often at the mercy of chance 
regarding who injures them.  Contract plaintiffs typically pay their 
lawyers by the hour, win or lose; tort plaintiffs usually pay their lawyers 
on contingency.96  Tort judgments are therefore also generally more 
generous to the plaintiff because plaintiffs pay their lawyers out of the 
judgments’ proceeds.97  In summary, contract damages are sharply 
limited compared to tort damages. 
B. Tort 
1.  Right is to Be Free of Injuries That Others Cause 
Tort rights, at least pre-injury, are negative, in the sense that each 
person has the right to be free of injuries others cause due to the others’ 
mens rea or strict liability.98 
2.  Plaintiff Has Rights Against Injurers (Involuntary Defendants) 
As the text above at section V(A)(2) suggests, tort plaintiffs are not 
 
90. CORBIN 11, supra note 69, at § 56.2.   
91. Banks McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of 
Responsibility and Remoteness, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 286, 286–87 (1985).   
92.  See Sebert, supra note 84, at 1567.   
93.  Id. at 1566.   
94.  See, e.g., Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State 
Farm Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 794 (2004).   
95.  Sebert, supra note 84, at 1566.   
96.  Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Malpractice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 274 (1998).   
97.  See, e.g., David G. Owen, Symposium, A Punitive Damages Overview:  Functions, 
Problems, and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (1994).   
98.  See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011) (definition of “tort”).   
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nearly as limited regarding the persons against whom the plaintiffs have 
rights.99  At any given time, the universe of persons against whom any 
individual has contract rights is extremely small; it is limited to those 
persons with whom the individual has previously entered into still 
enforceable contracts.100  The universe is larger for tort victims, because 
they need not intend to enter into legally enforceable promises with 
their defendants, tort plaintiffs merely need to interact in some way with 
potential defendants. 
Tort plaintiffs in general have rights against those who have injured 
the plaintiff in some way.101  That is, tort defendants, unlike contract 
defendants, are not persons whom the plaintiff voluntarily pre-selected 
for this particular legal relationship. 
a. Zone of Danger 
The universe of possible tort defendants for a given person at any 
particular time is obviously much wider than that of possible contract 
defendants.  While the plaintiff can only sue a small group of persons 
whom the plaintiff has pre-selected for contract breach, almost anyone 
with whom the plaintiff interacts can injure the plaintiff in some legally 
cognizable way.  Many courts (and famously in some cases) refer to this 
as the plaintiff’s danger zone.102 
b. Interaction Requirement 
Tort law in general requires that the defendant injure the plaintiff’s 
interests (e.g., body, property, dignity, etc.)103  Injuring a person’s 
interests usually requires some proximity to the plaintiff for the 
interaction necessary for the injury to occur.  The simplest and most 
concrete example serves the best: to injure someone physically and 
intentionally, the assailant (esoterica such as letter bombs aside), needs 
to be spatially close to the victim.104  Injuring a person’s property 
similarly requires proximity, but it is possible to injure a person’s 
intangible interests (e.g., reputation) without such proximity. 
 
99.  See, e.g., J. E. Leonarz, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Claimant’s Efforts 
to Recover from Other Sources As Prerequisite of Participation in Indemnity Fund for Losses 
Caused by Uninsured or Unknown Motorists, 7 A.L.R. 851 (3d ed. 1966).   
100.  See, e.g., CORBIN 9, supra note 58, at § 41.1.   
101.  Leonarz, supra note 99.   
102. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 350 (1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting).   
103.  Id. at 345.   
104.  Id. at 350.   
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c. Some Plaintiff Choice 
In many cases, tort plaintiffs have exercised some degree of choice 
regarding the defendants who injured the plaintiffs.  If a particular 
plaintiff fears injury by a particular party, or class of persons, the 
plaintiff can avoid interacting with those persons. 
d. Employers, Other Drivers, Owners of Land, Etc. 
There are, for example, certain situations and locations in which 
torts occur most frequently.  Automobile accidents are of course a 
common source of torts at present.105  If a person wants to avoid such an 
injury, he can refrain from driving, drive only in less trafficked locations, 
or drive during off hours; he can avoid stretches of road at time when he 
knows them to contain careless or reckless drivers, etc.  Workplace 
injuries are another common tort.106  (This article ignores workers’ 
compensation systems for simplicity of analysis; this does not affect the 
article’s thesis.)  When a person agrees to take a certain job, she to some 
degree chooses to run the risk of injury by her coworkers.  Landowners 
and the people who enter the land are choosing to expose themselves to 
the risk of injury by the other. 
In many tort cases, however, it is by random chance that a given 
defendant harms a given plaintiff.  One person can defame another 
without ever having met the other person or come into any contact with 
the other’s property.107  Property law (especially intangible property) is 
like tort law in this respect because a property defendant can be a 
complete stranger, with whom the plaintiff has never interacted.  For 
example, the United States Patent and Trademark office publishes all 
relevant information about every patented invention online; anyone in 
the world with internet access can easily acquire all the information 
necessary to infringe.108 
3. What Defendant Behavior Violates Rights 
A defendant violates another’s right to be free of torts by injuring 
the other person, with some degree of mens rea or by strict liability.109 
 
105.  See generally RICHARD S. KUHLMAN, KILLER ROADS: FROM CRASH TO 
VERDICT (1986).   
106.  See generally ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW (2011).   
107.  See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (defintion of “tort”). 
108.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).    
109.  See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (defintion of “tort”). 
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4.  Remedies Are Expansive 
Tort remedies reflect the increased set of possible defendants, and 
the lesser choice made by plaintiffs in exposing themselves to particular 
defendants, as opposed to contract cases. 
a. More Generous Than Contract 
For reasons the text above at section V(b)(ii) mentions, tort 
remedies are more generous to plaintiffs, ceteris paribus, than contract 
remedies. 
b. To Make Plaintiff Whole 
The principal goal of contract remedies is to give the plaintiff the 
benefit of her bargain; i.e., damages representing what she reasonably 
expected to receive from the breaching defendant.110  In commercial 
transactions of all types, both business and personal, contracting parties 
can reasonably expect to receive only reasonable amounts, and amounts 
roughly in some proportion with the consideration exchanged.111 
In torts, however, the remedial goal is to make the plaintiff whole; 
i.e., the damages should put her in her pre-tort position as best as money 
can.112  Unlike contract breaches, which cause mostly commercial 
harm,113 torts are much more likely to be personal, bodily, and 
devastating, and indeed even fatal.114  Plaintiffs injured when young can 
recover a lifetime of lost wages and medical expenses,115 plus possibly 
amounts to compensate them for psychological damage like pain and 
suffering.116  As the text above at sections V(a)(ii) and V(b)(ii) implies, 
plaintiffs can also recover punitive damages for certain torts.  Pain and 
suffering, mental distress, and the amount necessary to punish a 
defendant for any particular tort, are often difficult to measure, which 
may result in sympathetic fact finders choosing very large amounts.117 
 
110.  Sebert, supra note 84, at 1569.   
111.  Id. 
112.  See, e.g., Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Measure of Damages for Wrongful 
Death of Child under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), 2671–80),  25 A.L.R. 
Fed. 179 (2008).   
113.  Sebert, supra note 84, at 1568.   
114.  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 112.   
115.  See, e.g., id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  See generally BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).   
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c. Avoidability, Foreseeability, and Certainty Doctrines More Limited 
Courts also restrict the principal doctrines limiting recovery, i.e., 
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty, in tort cases.  In tort cases, 
courts generally deem foreseeable any injury the plaintiff’s wrongful 
action or omission caused, even if by indirect means.118  In contract 
cases, by contrast, courts only allow damages for events both parties 
reasonably should have anticipated, at the time the parties entered into 
the relevant contract, in event of the eventual breach.119 
Avoidability in tort cases usually just prohibits the plaintiff from 
actions or omissions that would make their injuries worse.120  In contract 
cases, plaintiffs generally have an affirmative duty to mitigate their 
damages, as by, e.g., seeking alternative buyers or sellers.121  Certainty in 
tort cases is generally equivalent to foreseeability, which in turn is much 
like causation;122 in contracts, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving the reasonable certainty of any damages element she claims.123  
Courts justify relaxing these limitations for the same reasons the text 
above in section V(a)(ii) describes, at least in part because of the tort 
plaintiff’s more limited ability to choose his defendant, and the 
correspondingly larger universe of possible tort defendants. 
In summary, tort damages are much more extensive than contract 
damages. 
C.  Property 
1.  Rights Are to Exclusive Possession, Use, and Enjoyment 
The owner’s rights in a piece of property are to exclusive possession, 
use, and enjoyment of the property.124 
2.  Plaintiff Has Rights “Against All the World” (Anyone Can Be 
Defendant) 
The universe of potential defendants is larger in property cases than 
it is in tort cases (in which, in turn, it is larger than in contract cases).  As 
 
118.  See, e.g., Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F. Supp 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).   
119.  See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exchequer).   
120.  See, e.g., Hall v. Dumitru, 250 Ill. App. 3d 759, 765 (1993).   
121.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2–715(2)(a) (2011).   
122.  See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 369.   
123.  See, e.g., Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., Inc., 371 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 
1988).   
124.  E.g., Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 147 N.E. 513 (Ohio 1925); Wilcox v. Penn 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1947).    
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the text above in section V(A)(2) explains, in contract cases, the set of 
possible defendants is those with whom plaintiff has contracted 
(voluntary defendants); in tort cases, it is those to whom plaintiff has 
exposed herself regarding injury risk (involuntary defendants). 
In property cases, however, the famous expression is that property 
owners have rights against “all the world,”125 i.e., everyone, 
everywhere.126  There is no limit to the set of potential defendants.  
When the property in question is tangible, including realty and chattels, 
the issue may arise of possible defendants having some spatial proximity 
to the property, but when the property is intangible (such as intellectual 
property, for example), there is no longer any spatial limitation on 
possible defendants. 
3.  Even Total Strangers Can Infringe or Trespass 
In contract and tort cases, there has to be some relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant, even some degree of the plaintiff seeking 
out the defendant; but in property cases even total strangers to the 
plaintiff can trespass or infringe.127  The archetypical property, real 
estate, gives the best examples.  Real estate, land and the buildings that 
improve it, is by definition immovable.128  Owners of real estate are 
often absent from the parcel for very long periods, and quite far away 
from it geographically.129  There is, indeed, absolutely no necessity for 
the owner of a parcel ever to visit it.130 
An owner’s dominion does not extend beyond the borders of her 
real property.131  It is beyond her control to prevent anyone (in most 
cases) from coming to the edge of her property.132  She therefore can 
have no idea who, if anyone, can trespass on her parcel.  She does not 
need to invite or license the stranger’s presence near her real estate.  If 
she is far away, she can be completely unaware of the trespass itself and 
the trespasser’s identity. 
The same is true of chattels, which are often far away from their 
 
125.   See Locke, supra note 29, at § 39. 
126.   E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1984).   
127.  For an example from 1365, see David S. Bogen, The Innkeeper’s Tale: The Legal 
Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51, 67 (1996).   
128.  See, e.g., 63 C. AM. JUR. PROP. § 13 (2d ed. 2011).   
129.  Id. at § 29.    
130.  Id.   
131.  49 P.L.E. Trespass § 39 (2011).     
132.  Id. 
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owners,133 and even more true for most intangible property, which has 
no specific location.134  Intellectual property, patents and copyrights in 
particular, are notoriously difficult for owners to police in today’s 
networked world.  After a patentee sells an embodiment of his 
invention, for example, he cannot control the embodiment’s subsequent 
possessors, each of whom may be able to reverse engineer the invention 
and infringe without the patentee’s knowledge.135  In this digital age, the 
challenge of copyright owners in preventing unauthorized copying is 
notorious.136  Complete strangers to the plaintiff property owner can 
trespass or infringe and become property claim defendants. 
One can therefore, in sum, think of possible contract defendants as 
voluntarily chosen by the plaintiff, possible tort defendants as 
involuntary, and property defendants as the sum of voluntary and 
involuntary defendants: everyone, or “all the world.” 
4.  What Defendant Behavior Violates Rights 
A defendant violates another’s property rights by unreasonably 
interfering with the other’s possession, use, or enjoyment of the other’s 
property.137 
5.  Remedies Regardless of Plaintiff’s Loss 
Contract remedies give the plaintiff what she expected from the 
defendant; tort remedies make the plaintiff whole after the defendant’s 
injury.  An owner with infringed property rights can receive remedies 
regardless of any loss to the owner.138  Property based causes of action 
are also generally strict liability; as in some torts, the plaintiff need 
prove no type of mens rea on the defendant’s part in order to prevail.139  
(As section V(a)(iv)(3) above explains, courts generally deem all 
contract breaches to be intentional, regardless of the defendant’s actual 
subjective state of mind in any case.)140 
 
133.  See, e.g., 63 C. AM. JUR. PROP. § 30 (2d ed. 2011).   
134.  See, e.g., 16 AM. JUR. CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 (2d ed. 2011).   
135.  See, e.g., Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 
19 DAYTON L. REV. 843, 845 (1994).   
136.  Gerardo Lara, Comment, The Piracy of American Films in China: Why the U.S. 
Art Form Is Not Protected by Copyright Laws in the People’s Republic of China, 2 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 343 (1997).   
137.  E.g., Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 147 N.E. 513 (Ohio 1925); Wilcox v. Penn 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1947).    
138.  See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. 772, 776 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).   
139.  See, e.g., AM. JUR. TRESPASS § 7 (2d ed. 2011).   
140.  Craswell, supra note 81, at 1502.   
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a. To Exonerate Property Right 
The law’s lack of any actual injury or mens rea requirement for 
actions enforcing property rights follows from the very nature of those 
rights.  Property rights after all are by definition exclusive.  As the text 
above at section IV(a)(ii) explains, there are a defined finite number of 
legal persons who are any property’s owners, and the owners’ property 
right is the legal right to exclude everyone else from the property.  
Property owners may do almost anything with their property: use it, 
ignore it, share it, assign it, destroy it, etc.141  To preserve these owners’ 
rights, the law must prevent, or at least respond to, any interference 
with a property owner’s rights, even one without injury or any degree of 
mens rea. 
b. Nominal Damages Available 
One way the law responds to interferences with a property owner’s 
rights that are unintentional, harmless, or both, is by awarding nominal 
damages.142  Trespassers to land, for example, are liable to landowners 
for nominal damages, even if the defendants trespassed unintentionally, 
and even if the trespasses caused no harm to the land or landowners.143  
If property rights are to be exclusive, the underlying policy requires that 
there be some vindication of the rights of owners who did not consent to 
the defendants’ mere presence on their properties.144  Nominal damages 
are often available in both tort and contract based causes of action.145 
6.  Summary and Transition 
All the remedies available under both contract and tort law are thus 
available under property law.  Any remedy that it available under either 
contract or tort law is also available under property law. 
This article has reviewed and analyzed the basics of contract, tort, 
and property law, paying special attention to the rights, remedies, and 
possible defendants pursuant to each doctrine.  This article will next 
explain trade secrets, so as to use them as a paradigm regarding how 
contract and tort rights, remedies, and defendants sum to property 
rights, remedies, and defendants. 
 
141.  See, e.g., AM. JUR. PROP. § 31 (2d ed. 2011).   
142.  In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. at 780.   
143.  Id. at 780–81 n. 9.   
144.  See, e.g., Stuart Cay Marina v. M/V Special Delivery, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1074–
75 (S.D. Fla. 2007).   
145.  DOBBS, supra note 88, at 221.   
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VI. TRADE SECRETS 
Trade secrets are a common and well-known type of intellectual 
property.146  They provide, intriguingly, an excellent example of how 
property rights, defendants, and remedies are the arithmetic sum of 
contract and tort rights and remedies. 
A. Definition 
A trade secret is simply “. . . business information that is kept 
confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors . . . .”147  A 
thorough parsing of the definition aids in a detailed understanding of 
trade secrets. 
1.  Information 
A trade secret is information.  There are two similar, but slightly 
different, detailed definitions of trade secrets in our modern law: one is 
from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the other is from the 
Restatement of Torts.148  Both give an explicitly nonexclusive list of the 
type of information that can qualify as a trade secret, including such 
information as formulas, processes, devices, patterns, compilations, 
programs, methods, techniques, and processes.149 
2.  Independent Economic Value to Possessor 
In order for information to qualify as a trade secret, the information 
must “derive independent economic (i.e., “trade”) value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by 
others who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”150  
 
146. Karl F. Jorda, The Foulston Siefkin Lecture, Patent and Trade Secret 
Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 WASHBURN L. J. 1 (2008).   
147. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1633 (9th ed. 2009).   
148. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985) (“‘Trade secret’ means information, 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.”); 
Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. LAW & 
TECH. 427, 431 (setting forth the definition of “trade secret” from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 757).   
149. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985) (“‘Trade secret’ means information, 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process”); 
Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. LAW & 
TECH. 427, 431 (setting forth the definition of “trade secret” from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ 757); see also, e.g., Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 818–19 
(8th Cir. 2004).   
150.  See, e.g., Gary S. Gaffney & Maria E. Ellison, A Primer on Florida Trade Secret 
Law: Unlocking the “Secrets” to “Trade Secret” Litigation, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 
(2003) (quoting Florida statute based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).   
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Independent economic value in this context means that the 
information’s possessor must have economic value (as opposed to, e.g., 
psychological gratification, etc.) from possessing the information, and 
the that value must be due to the inability of others (especially the 
possessor’s competitors) to use the information (not from, e.g., the 
inherent value of information that is useful but not secret).151  For 
example, a manufacturer may possess information that allows the 
manufacturer to make its product more cheaply than competitors. 
3.  Because Not Generally Known 
The name trade secret indicates that the heart of this intellectual 
property is its secrecy, and thus the very definition requires that the 
information, to keep its property nature, must remain unavailable to 
non-owners.152 
B.  Property 
Trade secret is the rare exception in our legal system in which pure 
information, by itself, has the characteristics of property.153  A major law 
dictionary defines “property” as: 
that dominion or indefinite right of use[ ], control, and 
disposition [that] one may lawfully exercise over particular things 
or objects154 . . . .  The right and interest [that] a [person] has in 
lands and chattels to the exclusion of others155 . . . . The right of a 
person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing.156 
Note that this definition, while current, does not comfortably 
encompass intellectual property (which, while certainly not land, is not 
exactly a chattel either), or indeed any intangible property. 
1.  Law Recognizes Trade Secrets as Property 
Our law does, however, recognize and enforce property rights (i.e., 
exclusion rights) in various forms of intellectual property; the name is 
 
151.  Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 546 
(2010).   
152.  Id.   
153.  See, e.g., id.   
154.  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (citing AM. JUR. PROPERTY § 2 
(2011)).   
155.  Id. (citing Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 147 N.E. 513 (Ohio 1925)).   
156.  Id. (citing Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1947)).   
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not a misnomer.157 
2.  Intellectual 
Each form of intellectual property comes with a set of exclusive 
rights; i.e., the right of the property owner to prevent others from using 
or enjoying the intangible property.158  Patent owners, for example, 
enjoy the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, or 
importing the patented invention;159 copyright owners have the right to 
prevent others from reproducing, adapting, or publicly distributing, 
displaying, or performing the copyrighted work;160 etc. 
C.  How Owner Keeps Trade Secrets as Property: Reasonable Secrecy 
The owner of a trade secret enjoys the right to prevent others from 
using or disclosing the subject information.161  To keep property rights in 
information as a trade secret, the information possessor must take 
affirmative continuing steps to keep the information to itself.162 
To win a trade secret infringement suit, the information’s possessor 
must affirmatively demonstrate that the possessor took reasonable steps 
to keep the information secret, even if those steps would not have 
prevented the particular infringement alleged.163  There are two general 
methods of keeping information secret to which courts look to satisfy 
this requirement. 
1.  Physical Protection of Information 
One way for the information possessor who desires trade secret 
property rights to keep the information secret is by physically protecting 
the information from discovery by others.164  This can be as simple as 
locking documents containing the information in a drawer, or password 
protecting the information on computer systems.165  If physical plant 
 
157.  Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity -- the Roadblock to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
799, 803 (2006).   
158.  Id.   
159.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).   
160.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).   
161.  Ghosh, supra note 157, at 803.   
162.  E.g., Enter. Leasing Co. v. Ehmke, 3 F.3d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir. 1999).   
163.  E.g., id.   
164.  E.g., Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130, 132–33 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1987) (the infamous “Lynchburg Lemonade” case). 
165.  Brian Bolinger, Focusing on Infringement: Why Limitations on Decryption 
Technology Are Not the Solution to Policing Copyright, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1103 
(2002).    
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embodies the information, for example, hiring security guards to keep 
unauthorized people from observing the plant qualifies.166 
2.  Nondisclosure Agreements 
The other way for the possessor to keep the information qualified 
for trade secret property right protection is by refusing to share the 
information with others.167  If, e.g., the possessor is a corporation, the 
possessor must not reveal the information to anyone outside the 
corporate organization.  If the possessor is an individual, the possessor 
must not reveal the information to anyone else. 
This limitation is impractical, of course, if the possessor, as is very 
often the case, needs others to know the information in order for the 
possessor to exploit the information fully.168  The law is therefore 
flexible on this point, allowing information possessors to share the 
information with others, without losing the information’s property 
exclusion characteristic, as long as the possessor first requires the 
recipient to agree (by contract, express or implied) to keep the 
information confidential.169  Even without any enforceable contract, a 
person who receives information pursuant to a confidential (i.e., 
fiduciary) relationship, may not legally misuse or disclose the 
information without the beneficiary’s consent.170 
As trade secret information is by definition commercial, most 
businesses, as a matter of course, require their employees and 
contractors who need to know the information to execute 
confidentiality agreements before the businesses disclose the 
information.171  As long as a possessor requires reasonable and legally 
enforceable nondisclosure agreements before disclosing the 
information, courts will enforce a property right in the trade secret.172 
D.  How Defendant Infringes Owner’s Legal Rights 
Before relating how defendants infringe trade secret owners’ rights, 
 
166.  Derek P. Martin, An Employer’s Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets from 
Employee Misappropriation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 949, 955–56 (1993).   
167.  See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and 
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 186 (2005).   
168.  See, e.g., Friemuth v. Fiskars Brands, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989 (W.D. Wis. 
2010).   
169.  See, e.g., id.   
170.  See, e.g., id.   
171.  See, e.g., id.   
172.  See, e.g., id.    
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this article briefly recounts, for context, how defendants infringe other 
plaintiffs’ rights. 
1.  Contract and Tort 
As the text above in sections V(A)(3), V(B)(3), and V(C)(4) 
describes, a defendant infringes a contract right by failing to perform a 
legally enforceable promise.173  A defendant infringes a tort right (more 
precisely the plaintiff’s right to be free of torts)174 by an unexcused 
action or omission that has the requisite degree of mens rea or strict 
liability, and that causes a cognizable injury to the plaintiff.175  A 
defendant infringes a property right by unreasonably interfering with 
the plaintiff owner’s use, possession, or enjoyment of the relevant 
property.176 
2.  Property Other Than Intellectual 
a.  Tangible 
Courts enforce most non-contractual causes of action arising from 
the plaintiff’s tangible chattels as torts.177  Minor interferences constitute 
trespass to chattels;178 major interferences, such as dispossession and 
destruction, constitute conversion.179  Some major non-contractual 
causes of action arising from plaintiff’s realty are also torts, principally 
trespass to land.180  Causes of action for nuisance are quasi-tort.181  
Property based torts are generally strict liability, while most other torts 
require some degree of mens rea.182 
The purest property causes of action (neither contract nor tort based 
in our legal system) regarding realty are in gross rights and 
corresponding burdens such as prescriptive easements,183 and 
 
173.  CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3. 
174.  See, e.g., Sonnier v. United States Casualty Co., 157 So. 2d 911, 913 (La. App. 
1963).   
175.  See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (defintion of “tort”). 
176.  See, e.g., AM. JUR. PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 2011).   
177.  See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2004).   
178.  Spickler v. Lombardo, 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 591, 599–600 (1977).   
179.  DirecTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d. at 1062.   
180.  Winters v. Turner, 278 P. 816, 818 (Utah 1929).   
181.  See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and 
Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2010).   
182.  See, e.g., AM. JUR. TRESPASS § 7 (2d ed. 2011).   
183.  See, e.g., Plymouth Canton Comm. Crier, Inc. v. Prose, 619 N.W.2d 725, 726 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000).   
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appurtenant rights and corresponding burdens such as involuntary 
servitudes.184  These are nevertheless theoretically based in either 
contract or tort (e.g., prescriptive easements can arise when property 
owners ignore trespassers, thereby presumably either waiving the 
owners’ tort rights or impliedly agreeing to the use).185 
b.  Intangible 
Courts have traditionally had more difficulty in general dealing with 
intangible property, because of its ethereal nature.186  This challenge has 
run through all aspects of property law: it took centuries for courts even 
to accept tangible chattels as property like land,187 and even longer for 
courts to grant the same dignity to intangibles.188 
Intangible property currently represents more of American wealth 
than ever before,189 and property law now protects intangibles just as it 
does tangible property.  Dispossessing a rightful owner of her non-
currency money (e.g., bank accounts, intangible property that represents 
about 90% of the money supply)190 amounts to the tort of conversion,191 
as does similar dispossession of assets like marketable securities (most 
of which are now non-certificated).192 
3.  Intellectual Property 
a.  Other Than Trade Secrets 
All intellectual property is intangible; it is, indeed, intangible to the 
second order, because not only are the legal rights intangible (as are all 
legal rights), but the subject matter of the rights are intangible as well.193  
While machines, manufactured articles, and compositions of matter may 
 
184.  See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 30 So. 2d 746, 753 (La. 1946).   
185.  See AM. JUR. EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN REAL PROPERTY § 39 (2d ed. 2011).   
186.  Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 15 P.3d 223, 229 (Cal. 2001).   
187.  See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 7 n. 4 (Little Brown 
1981).   
188.  See, e.g., KENNETH L. PORT, JAY DRATLER, JR., FAYE M. HAMMERSLEY, 
TERENCE P. MCELWEE, CHARLES R. MCMANIS, AND BARBARA A. WRIGLEY, LICENSING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter PORT].   
189. See, e.g., id. at xvii.   
190. See, e.g., The Money Supply, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,  
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed49.html (one of many money supply 
publications by the Federal Reserve System of the United States).   
191.  E.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Power Prods., 27 V.I. 126, 129 (Terr.Ct 
1992).    
192.  See, e.g., Opdyke v. Sec. S&L Co., 97 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1950).   
193.  See, e.g., PORT, supra note 188, at 6. 
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embody patented inventions,194 changes in ownership of these 
embodiments do not change the ownership of the underlying patent.195  
Copies and so-called “phonorecords” (which now includes compact 
disks, video disks, computer drives containing digital copies, etc.)196 
embody copyrighted works of authorship,197 but again, these tangible 
embodiments (chattels) are property separate from the underlying 
copyright.198 
To infringe a patent, a person must make, use, sell, or import 
embodiments of the patented invention without authorization.199  To 
infringe a copyright, a person must reproduce, adapt, or publicly 
distribute, display, or perform the copyrighted work without 
authorization.200  Infringement actions are strict liability; that is, the 
defendant need not intend to infringe in order to be liable.201  
Infringements of intellectual property rights are pure property causes of 
action.202  Infringements are also not breaches of contract; no one need 
first agree not to infringe to be liable.203 
b.  Trade Secrets 
Trade secrets are intellectual property, as are patents and 
copyrights,204 but trade secrets’ method of infringement is unique in a 
way that dramatically demonstrates that property is the sum of tort and 
contract.  To infringe on the trade secret property right, a person must 
do one of two things: breach a contract or commit a tort.  (While the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act calls the action creating liability relating to 
trade secrets “misappropriation,”205 “infringement” is a better word.  
This is not only because “infringement” is consistent with liability 
 
194.  See Day v. Union India-Rubber Co., 7 F. Cas. 271, 272 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856).   
195.  Id. at 274. 
196.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).   
197.  See id.   
198.  17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).   
199.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).   
200.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see, e.g., TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 
F. Supp. 2d 228, 235 (D.P.R. 2007).   
201.  Gener-Villar v. Adcom Group, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124 (D.P.R. 2007).   
202.  See, e.g., SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (D. Mass. 1988).   
203.  James M. McCarthy, When Does a Case Involving the Breach of a Copyright 
Licensing Contract “Arise under” the Copyright Act?, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 165, 169 (1993) 
(discussing copyright infringement as a property claim and not a breach of contract claim).   
204.  Johnson, supra note 151, at 546.   
205.  See, e.g., Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act -- Trends and 
Prospects, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 425 (2010).   
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regarding other forms of intellectual property,206 but also because some 
actions causing trade secret liability do not in fact amount to 
misappropriation, but rather misuse, such as acquiring trade secret 
information by mistake and using or disclosing it after notice of the 
mistake.)207 
i.  By Breaching Nondisclosure Agreement 
One of the two ways to infringe a trade secret is to use or disclose 
the relevant information in contravention of a legally enforceable 
confidentiality agreement.208  If a recipient of information, in order to 
receive information that qualifies as a trade secret, first promises 
(whether expressly or impliedly) not to use or disclose that information 
in a particular way, and then does so, the recipient is liable for trade 
secret infringement (i.e., has violated a property right), because the 
recipient has breached a contract.209 
ii.  Or by Tort 
The only other way to infringe a trade secret is by acquiring, 
disclosing, or using the information against the will of the information’s 
lawfully rightful possessor (i.e., the trade secret property owner).210  
Note that, as the text immediately below describes in detail, one can 
only do this by committing a tort. 
(a)  By the Tort of Conversion 
For example, if a paper document that is not the property of the 
infringer contains the trade secret information, the infringer converts a 
chattel by taking the document.  If an intangible document (e.g., a 
computer file) that is not the infringer’s property contains the 
information, it is still conversion if the infringer takes the intangible 
document, or the information it contains, without the owner’s 
permission.211 
(b)  By the Tort of Trespass 
Many cases show that a typical way for a trade secret infringer to 
 
206.  E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 851 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of 
“infringement”).   
207.  Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(ii) (1985).   
208.  See, e.g., id. at § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II).    
209.  See, e.g., City Slickers, Inc. v. Douglas, 40 S.W.3d 805, 811–12 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2001).   
210.  See, e.g., id. at 808 (The trade secret holder’s active concealment of the secret 
implies that obtaining and using information is against the will of the trade secret holder.).   
211.  See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2004).   
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acquire the subject information, without authorization, is to enter the 
trade secret owner’s property so that the infringer can, by observation, 
obtain the information.212  Such behavior is of course the tort of trespass 
to land, even if the owner is merely leasing the land or building into 
which the infringer entered.213  Courts presume that the owner would 
never authorize an entry that is wrongfully to acquire information the 
owner treats as a trade secret.214 
(c)  By the Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
There are cases in which trade secret infringement defendants 
acquire the relevant information not pursuant to a contract and without 
entering the plaintiff’s premises either without permission or under false 
pretenses.215  In these cases, the defendants often observe the relevant 
information from a distance, using some type of surveillance equipment 
(possibly as simple as cameras,216 or as complex as hiring photographers 
to fly over defendant’s site).217  These cases still involve some sort of 
tortious or at least quasi-tortious behavior by the defendant or her 
agents, namely invasion of privacy.218  Trade secret law requires that the 
defendant, to be liable for infringement in these cases, have some 
degree of tort mens rea, such as “commercial improprieties.”219 
(d)  By the Tort of Fiduciary Duty Breach 
In some cases recipients of information may have not have agreed to 
keep the information secret and may have received the information in a 
manner that did not involve any wrongful conduct by the recipient.  The 
recipient may nevertheless have received the information pursuant to a 
relationship in which the recipient was acting as a fiduciary.  Many 
relationships, most notably agency (which includes employment and 
most professional relationships), make one of the parties the fiduciary 
of the other.220  The fiduciary relationship places strict legal obligations 
on the fiduciary in favor of the other party to the relationship (the 
 
212.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Vukovich, 825 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).   
213.  See, e.g., id.   
214.  See, e.g., AM. JUR. TRESPASS § 74 (2d ed. 2011).   
215.  See, e.g., Coleman, 825 N.E.2d at 407.      
216.  Samuel J. Horovitz, If You Ain’t Cheating You Ain’t Trying: “Spygate” and the 
Legal Implications of Trying Too Hard, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 305, 307 (2009) 
(discussing professional football coaching staff’s use of cameras to learn play signals from 
opposing teams).   
217.  E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 
1970).   
218.  Id. at 1016.   
219.  Id. at 1015.   
220.  Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus., L.L.C., 753 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Iowa 2008).   
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beneficiary),221 including a duty of confidence.222  (Indeed, writers often 
call fiduciary relationships “confidential” relationships.)223 
A person who receives information pursuant to a fiduciary 
relationship therefore has a legal obligation to keep the information 
confidential, and not to use the information for the recipient’s own 
purposes, unless waived by the beneficiary.  Breach of this 
confidentiality obligation is a tort.224 
(e)  By a Strict Liability Tort 
Trade secret infringement can be strict liability, just as in patent, 
copyright, and other property and tort law.225  That is, a defendant need 
not have any degree of mens rea to be liable for intellectual property 
infringement, although intentional infringement may lead to enhanced 
damages.226 
There are several ways a recipient of trade secret information can 
violate the owner’s rights without intending to infringe.227  For example, 
if an information recipient learns the information due to a third party’s 
breach of a confidentiality requirement, but the recipient does not know 
that the information is a trade secret and that the third party breached, 
the recipient can use or disclose the information without liability.228  
Once the recipient constructively learns of the breach and the trade 
secret status of the information, continued use is infringement.229 
4.  Transition and Synthesis 
When one thoughtfully considers all the facts above together, one 
can see how trade secret law illustrates that property law is the 
arithmetic sum of contract law and tort law. 
 
221.  E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of “fiduciary”). 
222.  Cemen Tech, Inc., 753 N.W.2d at 8.   
223.  Id. at 13.   
224.  E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).   
225.  See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997)); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d 
Cir. 1995).   
226.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 284; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3(b) 
(1985).   
227.  Id.   
228.  Id.   
229.  Id.   
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VII. TRADE SECRETS ARE SUM OF RELATED CONTRACT AND TORT 
RIGHTS, DEFENDANTS, AND REMEDIES 
A.  Trade Secrets Are Property, But . . . 
In review, our law treats qualifying trade secret information as the 
property of the rightful possessor.  Trade secrets are one of the four 
basic types of intellectual property (the others being copyright, patent, 
and trademark).230  The owner of a trade secret can get courts to enforce 
his property rights in the information, by awarding him damages from 
the infringing defendant, by enjoining the defendant, or both.231  To do 
this, however, the owner must prove at least one of two things. 
1.  Infringement Requires Breach of Contract 
The owner must prove that the defendant failed to perform a legally 
enforceable promise of the defendant’s to the plaintiff, even if only 
implied.  That promise must be that the defendant would keep the trade 
secret information confidential, use the information only in a certain 
way, or both.  The plaintiff must prove, in short, that the defendant 
breached a contract. 
2.  Or Tortious Behavior 
The only other way a trade secret owner can enforce his property 
right against a defendant is if the owner proves that the defendant 
trespassed on his land, invaded his privacy in some commercially 
immoral way, committed a strict liability tort, or breached the 
defendant’s fiduciary duty.  The owner must prove, in short that the 
defendant committed tortious behavior. 
To enforce trade secret rights, which are property rights, the owner, 
as plaintiff, must prove that the defendant either breached a contract or 
committed a tort, or both.  Trade secrets, as property, contain within 
them both the owners’ rights to enforce related agreements limiting 
disclosure and use, and the owners’ rights to be free of conversions, 
trespasses, fiduciary duty breaches, privacy invasions, etc.  Trade secret 
rights, which are property rights, are therefore a composite of contract 
rights and tort rights. 
 
230.  See, e.g., Jonathan D. Carpenter, Intellectual Property:  The Overlap between 
Utility Patents, Plant Patents, the PVPA, and Trade Secrets and the Limitations on That 
Overlap, 81 N.D. L. REV. 171, 172 (2005). 
231.  Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 2–3 (1985).   
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B.  Remedies 
Just as trade secret rights are the sum of tort rights and property 
rights, trade secret remedies are the sum of the corresponding contract 
remedies and tort remedies. 
1.  Include Contract Remedies 
Trade secret owners that are prevailing plaintiffs can receive awards 
of damages representing the owners’ reasonable expectations regarding 
the defendants’ performances.232  These damages include the plaintiffs’ 
lost profits due to the infringement.233  The owner expected the 
defendant to honor the defendant’s nondisclosure obligation; when the 
defendant breaches, the plaintiff’s lost profits are the expectation 
interest.234  Courts will also grant equitable relief to owners, preventing 
defendants from additional breaches of related agreements regulating 
the use and disclosure of the information.235 
These remedies are of course the standard breach of contract 
remedies.236  Courts grant these remedies, however, without regard to 
whether any particular plaintiff proves breach of contract; i.e., courts 
grant contract remedies in appropriate cases even if the plaintiffs proved 
infringement by defendant’s tortious behavior (e.g., trespass, etc.).237 
2.  And Tort Remedies 
Trade secret owners that are prevailing plaintiffs can receive awards 
of damages that make owners whole after the losses the defendants’ 
infringements caused.238  These damages include the plaintiffs’ lost 
profits, i.e. the amount the plaintiffs lost due to the defendants’ tortious 
behavior.  Plaintiff trade secret owners can recover lost profits even in 
the absence of breached nondisclosure agreements.239  Owners can also 
recover the defendants’ wrongful profits made from defendants’ use of 
 
232.  See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Application of Patent Law Damages Analysis to 
Trade Secret Misappropriation Claims: Apportionment, Alternatives, and Other Common 
Limitations on Damages, 25 SEATTLE U. L. R. 821, 826 (2002).    
233.  Id. at 832. 
234.  Id.   
235.  See, e.g., D. Kirk Jamieson, Just Deserts: A Model to Harmonize Trade Secret 
Injunctions, 72 NEB. L. REV. 515, 516 (1993).   
236.  E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981).   
237.  E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 2–3 (2011).   
238.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 232, at 826–66.   
239.  E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3 (2011).   
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plaintiffs’ trade secrets;240 these are restitutionary recoveries.241  Plaintiff 
owners can, in addition, recover nominal damages when appropriate, 
and punitive damages for defendants’ willful trade secret 
infringement.242 
Trade secret owners that are prevailing plaintiffs can also, as stated 
above, receive injunctions preventing further use or disclosure of the 
information by the defendants.  This remedy is the same as injunctions 
preventing future or continuing torts, which courts commonly grant.243  
Courts therefore grant to prevailing trade secret plaintiffs all the same 
remedies courts regularly grant to successful tort plaintiffs; this is 
without regard to whether any particular plaintiff proved facts 
amounting to a tort in a specific case.244 
C.  Trade Secrets 
Consider the integration of what the text above demonstrates 
regarding trade secrets. 
1.  Are Property 
Trade secrets are property; i.e., the law gives owners exclusive rights 
in trade secret information, which owners can enforce in court by 
receiving the corresponding property remedies. 
a.  Alienable 
Trade secrets have all the legal characteristics of all property 
interests.  Trade secrets are freely alienable by the rightful possessors of 
qualifying information.245  Owners can exploit, sell, lend, license, 
hypothecate, or keep trade secrets to themselves;246 these are defining 
characteristics of property.247 
b.  Need Not Exploit 
Trade secret owners do not need to exploit the information to 
 
240.  Smith, supra note 232, at 836.   
241.  Id. at 841.   
242.  See, e.g., Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Johnson, 23 P.3d 1287, 1288–90 (Colo. App. 2001).   
243.  See, e.g., Baranan v. Fulton County, 209 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1974).   
244.  See, e.g., Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1958).   
245.  E.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223–25 (2d Cir. 1971).   
246.  E.g., ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 
2.01 (2011).   
247.  See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); MILGRIM, supra 
note 246, at § 2.02.   
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preserve the information’s character as property.248  Owners can destroy 
or ignore the information as they choose,249 just as property owners may 
in most cases.250  (There are of course familiar exceptions to this latter 
rule for some property owners in some cases, particularly in situations in 
which there are multiple possessors of, users of, or claimants to a given 
parcel of real estate.251  In those situations, courts often invoke such 
doctrines as those regarding “owners sleeping on their rights”252 or 
“highest and best use.”253) 
2.  But Also Sum of Tort and Contract 
As the discussion above at section VII(B) demonstrates, however, 
trade secret rights and remedies are also the aggregation of contract and 
tort rights and remedies.  Infringement of trade secret requires the 
defendant either to breach a legally enforceable promise or commit 
tortious behavior such as trespass or invasion of privacy.254 
a.  Rights and Defendants are Cumulative 
A trade secret owner’s rights, as a property owner, are to exclusive 
use, possession, and enjoyment of her property: the trade secret 
information.255  The owner’s rights are also to satisfaction of its 
reasonable expectations when sharing the information (contract rights) 
and to be free of conversion, trespass, and fiduciary duty breach 
regarding the information (tort rights). 
The possible defendants in a trade secret infringement case consist 
of breach of contract defendants (those who received the trade secret 
information pursuant to an express or implied agreement not to disclose 
or misuse the information) and tort defendants (those who acquired or 
 
248.  See, e.g., MILGRIM, supra note 246, at § 2.01.   
249.  See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71, 80 (Cal. 2004).   
250.  See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An 
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 641 (2008).   
251.  See, e.g., id. at 640–42.   
252.  See, e.g., Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession against the States: The Hornbooks 
Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 941 (1996).   
253.  See, e.g., id. at  956 n. 83.   
254.  See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 412 (W.D. Mich. 1908) 
(defendants allegedly spied to steal trade secrets); Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus., 
L.L.C., 753 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2008) (defendant breached nondisclosure agreement in 
disclosing secret information).   
255.  David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal 
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 
543, 545 (1992).   
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misused the information pursuant to conversion, trespass, fiduciary duty 
breach, etc.). 
b.  Remedies are Cumulative 
A trade secret owner’s remedies for infringement are damages 
representing the plaintiff’s lost profits, the defendant’s wrongful profits, 
a reasonable royalty for the infringing activity, or some combination of 
these to restore the plaintiff to his pre-infringement position and give 
him the benefit of any bargain he made with the defendant; and 
injunctions preventing further infringement.256  These remedies consist 
of breach of contract remedies (lost profits and reasonable royalties are 
expectation damages, and a combination restoring the plaintiff to his 
pre-infringement position is reliance damages257) and tort remedies (the 
injunction preventing future wrongful activity, as well as nominal and 
punitive damages). 
VIII. EXPLANATORY POWER 
While the analysis above is interesting theoretically and from a 
jurisprudential standpoint, one must consider what ramifications the 
insight has for the law in general, especially property law outside of the 
intellectual property field. 
One of the signs of a valuable analytic method is its ability to 
explicate existing unexplained outcomes.258  This is especially valuable in 
law: economic analysis of law, for example, has been well received and 
influential at least in part because it is able to explain many of what 
observers might perceive to be inconsistencies or oddities in our legal 
system.259  (E.g., economic analysis of law has successfully justified such 
doctrines as the unenforceability of penalties for breaching contracts, 
etc.)260 
A.  Rights and Defendants 
Property owners’ rights are to exclusive use, possession, and 
enjoyment of their properties, and within reason, how the owners 
 
256.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 232, at 826–66.   
257.  E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3 and accompanying official comments (1985).   
258.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Path of the Law Today: Prediction and 
Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998) (using existing law and case decisions to predict the 
outcome of future cases).   
259.  E.g., Lahav, supra note 76, at 163.   
260.  E.g., id.   
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choose to use and enjoy their properties are the owners’ choices.  This is 
a composite of the tort right, to be free of injuries to their properties, 
and the contract right to the owner’s expectations that others will 
perform as promised regarding the property.  That is, if others injure the 
property (or property rights) of an owner, or do not perform regarding 
the property as promised (as to redeliver, repair, care for, the property, 
etc.), the owner is denied exclusive use, possession, or enjoyment of the 
property. 
Plaintiffs choose their potential contract defendants by entering into 
legally enforceable agreements with the defendants.  Plaintiffs exercise 
less choice, and occasionally none at all, regarding their potential tort 
defendants.  Potential contract defendants are therefore voluntary, and 
potential tort defendants involuntary.  Potential property defendants 
include everyone: “all the world” in Locke’s famous phrase.  The sum of 
voluntary defendants and involuntary defendants is everyone. 
B.  Remedies 
1.  Assumpsit 
Viewing property as the sum of tort and contract helps explain 
certain oddities of property law.  Some of the easiest examples come 
from the field of property remedies.  An obvious one is that favorite of 
law school and bar examination students: the doctrine of “waiving the 
tort and suing in assumpsit.”  While modern practice disfavors such old 
fashioned Latin legalese terms as “assumpsit,”261 the doctrine is alive and 
well in current practice, although often called “quasi-contract,”262 a 
name that better illustrates how property is the sum of tort and contract. 
In property based causes of action such as conversion, the plaintiff 
property owner often has a choice of remedies.263  The tort remedy is 
generally damages for the market value, at the time of conversion, of 
the converted property.264  If the plaintiff can show the property was 
unique and hence irreplaceable (meaning that the presumption that the 
plaintiff can use the damages to purchase a substitute does not apply), 
the court will sometimes issue a mandatory injunction requiring the 
defendant to return possession of the property to the plaintiff.  These 
are the common law tort remedies of replevin, for chattels, or ejectment, 
 
261.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 384–91.   
262.  Id. at 384–91. 
263.  E.g., Vissenberg v. Bresnahen, 202 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1949).   
264. E.g., Bayer v. Airlift Int’l, Inc., 268 A.2d 548, 552 (N.J. Ch. 1970) (quoting Dimock 
v. United States Nat’l Bank, 25 A. 926, 928 (N.J. 1893)).   
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for realty.265  There is also the quasi-contract remedy of assumpsit. 
To begin with the simplest example, consider a defendant who 
misappropriates the plaintiff’s money.  Money is of course property,266 so 
the plaintiff’s causes of action and remedies are property based.  The 
plaintiff’s cause of action is for conversion.267  Despite money being 
fungible, the conversion tort cause of action requires the plaintiff, in an 
action for damages, to prove specifically which identifiable money the 
defendant wrongfully took.268  If the plaintiff can satisfy that 
requirement (along with, of course, all the other elements of the cause 
of action), the plaintiff can receive a damages judgment for the value of 
the misappropriated money.269 
Conversion being a property-based cause of action, however, the 
plaintiff can choose an alternate, contract based, remedy to the tort 
damages remedy already discussed.  This is what the common law of 
restitution called “waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit.”270  Assumpsit 
means quasi-contract, that is, an implied contract between the plaintiff 
and defendant.271  In this alternative, the plaintiff does not have to prove 
the misappropriation of specific identifiable funds, but merely that the 
circumstances have unjust enriched the defendant.272  The theory is one 
of the “common counts” of debt collection: that the defendant “had and 
received” the plaintiff’s money, and that receipt and possession contains 
an implicit promise to repay the money to the plaintiff.  By keeping the 
plaintiff’s money, the defendant breaks the implicit promise (and thus 
breaches an implied contract), and it would be unjust to allow the 
defendant to keep the money.273 
The money conversion plaintiff, as a property owner, thus has 
remedies in both tort and in contract.  This doubling of remedies, one 
tort based, and one contract based, in property related causes of action 
is the rule, not the exception.  For example, the cause of action for the 
conversion of a chattel (i.e., tangible personal property that is not 
 
265.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 384–91. 
266.  See In re Estate of Miller, 48 Cal. 165, 169 (1874) (using an interesting historical 
treatment of the definition of “money”).   
267.  E.g., In re Thebus, 483 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ill. 1985).   
268.  Id. at 1260.   
269.  Id. at 1261.     
270.  E.g., Bd. of Hwy. Commrs. v. Bloomington, 97 N.E. 280, 284–85 (Ill. 1911).   
271.  Id. 
272.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 384–87. 
273.  Id. at 210.      
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money274) provides the same choice of tort damages or quasi-contract 
restitution as does the cause of action for money misappropriation.275 
2.  Bailments 
Bailments are another example of this accumulation of remedies.  A 
bailor gives temporary possession of the subject property to the bailee, 
such as when one leaves one’s car with a mechanic for repairs or leaves 
one’s clothes with a cleaner.276  If the bailor wrongfully refuses to return 
the bailed property, the owner has, again, a choice of a contract based 
remedy and a tort based remedy.  The property owner can sue the 
bailee for damages resulting from the breach of contract, such as the 
money the bailor paid the bailee for work not done or improperly done 
on the bailed goods.277  The owner can also recover tort damages for 
destruction, conversion, or damage to the goods bailed.278 
Both the conversion and bailment examples demonstrate that 
property based causes of action have two sets of remedies: a basic 
contract like remedy, which essentially effects the sale of the subject 
property, and also an additional, often restitutionary, tort remedy that is 
frequently more generous to the property owning plaintiff than the 
contract remedy.  This article’s thesis, that property is the sum of 
contract and tort, helps explain this apparent oddity in property law. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Hegel argued that tort and crime law are together the 
sum of contract and property law.  A better, more current, explanation 
in American law property is the sum of contract and tort.  Trade secret 
law illustrates this proposal well, because trade secret rights, defendants, 
and remedies are the total of respective contract and tort rights, 
defendants, and remedies.  Trade secret law thus illustrates how 
contract and tort come together to create property rights.  This theory 
helps understand why, e.g., property based causes of action, even those 
outside the intellectual property field, have both a tort based and a 
contract based remedy. 
 
 
274. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (definition of “chattels 
personal”)(citing 42 AM. JUR. 2D Property § 24).   
275.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 388–90. 
276.  E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of “bailment”).   
277.  E.g., AM. JUR. BAILMENTS § 130 (2d ed. 2011).   
278.  E.g., id. 
